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BOOK REVIEWS
Matthew M. Aid, Intel Wars: The Secret History of the Fight Against Terror (New
York: Bloomsbury Press, 2012). Pp. 262, index. $28.00. Hb. ISBN 978-1-608-
19481-0.
Matthew Aid is best known as a historian of the National Security Agency and
American signals intelligence, but in this new book he tackles a broader subject: the
state of the American intelligence community (IC) since the beginning of the Obama
administration. And according to Aid, that state is not very good. American
intelligence agencies have been unable to understand developments in rogue regimes
such as in Iran and North Korea, they failed to give warning of the Arab Spring
uprisings, they have made little headway in the fight against terrorism despite the
killing of Osama bin Laden, and worst of all, they have helped make a mess of things
in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Aid does give the intelligence community credit for a few successes,most notably the
killing of bin Laden. But for themost part this book is a lament froma former IC insider
(Aid was once a Russian linguist for the US Air Force) who believes American
intelligence agencies and analysts have failed to live up to the high expectations that
were set for them during the burst of intelligence reforms after the 9/11 attacks.
His strongest criticism focuses on Afghanistan and Pakistan, but some of his
most interesting comments address American domestic intelligence and homeland
security.
Aid givesmixed reviews to the intelligence community’s performance inAfghanistan.
On the one hand, he writes that the IC was trying to warn of growing problems in that
country from2002 to2008, but it facedpolicymakers at theWhiteHouse andPentagon
whowould not listen andwhopreferred instead to see the rosy side of thewar. Butwhile
Aid credits the ICwith seeing the big picture better thanWashington policymakers did,
he argues that when it came to understanding the culture and the specifics of the
situation on the ground, intelligence assessments were weak.
There are several heroes in Aid’s book, and one of the most prominent is Michael
T. Flynn, who became the senior American intelligence officer in Afghanistan in 2009
and is now Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Aid’s comments about
intelligence problems in Afghanistan reflect a highly publicized critique Flynn wrote
in 2010.1 Flynn attempted to shake up what Aid says had become ‘a nightmarish
1Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger and Paul D. Batchelor, Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making
Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan (Center for a New American Security, January 2010).
Similar criticisms can also be seen in an unpublished draft Department of Defense study on
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Macedonian fruit salad’ of more than 20 major intelligence organizations operating
in Afghanistan, and put more emphasis on trying to understand the political,
economic, and social conditions of the country (p.65). But those positive changes
began to be overturned, Aid writes, after Flynn left Afghanistan for more senior
positions within US intelligence. The focus on cultural intelligence, in particular, has
been replaced by a return to the old emphasis on locating Taliban commanders so
that raids by US and NATO Special Forces can kill them.
Aid’s view of the importance of Pakistan as a source of difficulty for American
intelligence can be summed up in the title of one chapter: ‘The Root of All Evil’. His
discussion of poor relations between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the
Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) is familiar and occasionally
leans toward cliche´, as when he writes that the relationship ‘can only be described
as a tempestuous, love–hate relationship’ (p.100). Much of the material in the
book, and especially in the sections on Afghanistan and Pakistan, comes from
classified documents published by WikiLeaks. Another major source of material
appears to be interviews with US government officials and others, and Aid writes
that he conducted dozens of such interviews, but that he cannot identify
them because of the Obama administration’s aggressive efforts to prosecute
leakers and whistle-blowers. As a result, many statements and assertions in the
book have no specific source attribution, making it more difficult for readers to
gauge the reliability of that information. Interviews with Pakistani sources, for
example, appear to be the source for Aid’s reporting about CIA activities in
Pakistan that have not been widely discussed elsewhere, including its use of what
he describes as ‘a small but very capable cadre of Pakistani operatives’ (p.2) inside
that country.
Aid credits the intelligence community with improving relations with Congress,
and with successful efforts in Iraq that helped allow US military forces to be
withdrawn from that country. Aid’s telling of the effort to find and kill Osama bin
Laden covers mostly familiar ground, and that story has been better told elsewhere,
especially by Peter Bergen.2 He writes that the killing of bin Laden accomplished
little, because Al Qaeda had already become no more than ‘a bit player in global
terrorism’ (p.132). The real international terrorist threat remains high, he warns, as
anti-American sentiment grows and new terrorist groups continue to gain strength in
countries around the world.
Aid is critical of the CIA’s efforts to understand developments in Iran, arguing
that because the work has to be done from bases outside the country, such as
from Dubai, little success has been possible. He describes attempts by the CIA and
other agencies to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program, but readers interested in this topic
can find a more detailed discussion in David Sanger’s new book, Confront and
Conceal.3 It is even harder, Aid writes, for American intelligence to penetrate North
lessons learned from the past decade of war. See Spencer Ackerman, ‘War Study: Troops Had
Bad Intel, Worse Spin’, Danger Room, 11 June 2012, ,http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/
2012/06/intel-wars/?utm_source ¼ Contextly&utm_medium ¼ RelatedLinks&utm_
campaign ¼ Previous. (accessed 24 October 2012).
2Peter L. Bergen, Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for Bin Laden from 9/11 to Abbottabad
(New York: Crown Publishers 2012).
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Korea, which he argues represents just as great a threat of war as it did during the
Cold War. The United States and its ally South Korea have ‘virtually no intelligence
assets in North Korea’ (p.207). Aid’s section on North Korea shows how books on
current issues can easily become dated, as this was written before the death of the
North’s leader Kim Jong-il; but continuing intelligence gaps about North Korea, and
the fact that American intelligence agencies apparently did not learn about Kim’s
death for two days, suggest that Aid’s critiques are spot on.4
Concerning the role of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in running the
intelligence community, Aid makes the familiar argument that the DNI needs to be
provided more authority and needs to act as a real leader. He writes favorably of the
ultimately failed efforts by Dennis Blair, who as DNI attempted to lead the
intelligence community in much the same way he used to lead military forces as a
four-star Navy admiral. Aid calls Blair ‘a tragic figure’ who was unfairly blamed for
the ‘underwear bomber’ incident of Christmas Day 2009, and who lost a power
struggle with CIA Director Leon Panetta (p.160). Aid credits Blair with many
accomplishments during his tenure as DNI, including increasing focus on
Afghanistan and on the growing problem of narco-violence in Mexico.
Some of the most interesting sections of this book concern domestic intelligence
and homeland security issues. Aid argues that ‘the threat of domestic homegrown
terrorism has continued to evolve in more dangerous directions’ in recent years, yet
the IC has not adapted to this new threat (p.8). What is being done by intelligence
agencies, he argues, either violates civil liberties, such as efforts to conduct broad
surveillance of Muslims and mosques, or is foolish, such as notices sent out to local
law enforcement agencies warning them to be on the lookout for anyone who
appears to show ‘new or increased interest’ in critical infrastructure facilities or
landmarks (p.174).
Aid is particularly worried about what the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is
doing. He writes that although the consensus within American intelligence in recent
years has been that there is no significant terrorist threat from within the American
Muslim population, the FBI disagrees with this view. According to Aid, the FBI ‘has
been engaged in a large-scale effort to monitor those Muslim American groups or
individuals the bureau believes might be inclined to give aid or comfort to al Qaeda
or other foreign terrorist groups’ (p.167). The effort spans the country, from FBI-led
Joint Terrorism Task Forces in every state, to the town of Manassas, Virginia, where
he writes that an FBI front company operates out of the Manassas Regional Airport,
flying Cessna air surveillance missions over the Washington, DC, area. Other flights,
by helicopters, are flown from Davison Army Airfield at Fort Belvoir, Virginia
(pp.167–8). He writes that Congress is not conducting oversight of these flights, nor
do members of Congress even appear to know about them.5
3David E. Sanger, Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of
American Power (New York: Crown Publishers 2012).
4Ken Dilanian, ‘North Korea is a Tough Target for U.S. Intelligence Agencies’, Los Angeles
Times, 24 December 2011.
5FBI flight operations are not a secret, although little appears to have been written about them.
A recent report by the Department of Justice Inspector General describes the Bureau’s aviation
operations in general terms, with many specific details removed from the version of the report
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Aid is worried about the use of domestic terrorism watch lists, which he says
have grown significantly after the failed bombing attempt in New York’s Times
Square in 2010, and ‘today, nobody seems to know for certain how many of these
watch lists actually exist, whose names are on them, or, more important, how
these names got put on the lists in the first place’ (p.169). But although he believes
intelligence agencies have been going too far to conduct domestic surveillance
operations, he also believes the IC has not done enough to understand the
emerging homegrown terrorism threat. A major reason why the federal
government has been slow to understand and act on domestic threats, he
believes, is that the agency charged with leading this effort – the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) – is a weak organization that has never been respected
within the government. One of its biggest problems came at its creation, when the
decision was made to leave the FBI under the Department of Justice, rather than
move it to the new DHS. As a result, Aid writes, the FBI and DHS have a tense
and hypercompetitive relationship that weakens the struggle against domestic
terrorism.
Another major failing of DHS is its intelligence branch, which Aid describes as
dysfunctional, beset by weak leadership, and seen as illegitimate by the rest of the
intelligence community. The problems with DHS’s intelligence efforts are seen most
clearly, he writes, in the network of state and local intelligence fusion centers that are
the centerpiece of those efforts. DHS spends millions of dollars to support these
centers, but because they are under state and local control there is no effective
regulation, the number and location of fusion centers is based more on politics than
recognized need, the standards are lax, and the intelligence they produce is often
shoddy.6
This book is quite different from Aid’s previous book on the National Security
Agency (NSA), The Secret Sentry, which was a much more thoroughly documented
history of that agency.7 By comparison, this book lacks depth, and suffers from the
absence of an overarching theme or focus. It does not try to be as comprehensive in
its review of recent American intelligence history as for example John Diamond was
in his longer book on the IC up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, The CIA and the
Culture of Failure.8 Nor does it provide a detailed, closely argued account of any one
part of that history, although it comes close to accomplishing that goal in its
discussion of intelligence inadequacies in Afghanistan.
made public; see US Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General Audit Division, ‘The
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Aviation Operations’, ,http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/
2012/a1221.pdf . (accessed 24 October 2012).
6Some of these problems may be even greater than Aid describes. For example, he writes that
for political reasons there are four separate fusion centers in California; there are actually six
such centers in that state. See Department of Homeland Security, ‘Fusion Center Locations
and Contact Information’ ,http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-
information . (accessed 24 October 2012).
7Matthew M. Aid, The Secret Sentry: The Untold History of the National Security Agency
(New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009).
8John Diamond, The CIA and the Culture of Failure: U.S. Intelligence from the End of the
Cold War to the Invasion of Iraq (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008).
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Many of the individual stories Aid tells have been told elsewhere in more detail,
such as by David Sanger and Peter Bergen as noted above, or by Dana Priest and
William Arkin on the growth of the domestic intelligence establishment.9 Some
sections tend to become dated quickly, such as his comment that the intelligence
community has so much money it suffers from ‘an embarrassment of riches’ (p.214).
That was likely true only a few years ago, but it will be interesting to see how the IC
fares in the face of government cutbacks today. And Aid writes that Iran and Syria
have been largely quiet, and rate as unheralded success stories for American
intelligence; that may have been the case a few years ago, but the current unrest
gripping Syria, and uncertainties about Iran’s nuclear programs, would prompt few
today to call either country ‘quiet’ or to be quick to describe intelligence efforts there
as successful.
In some sections Aid seems to be reaching too hard to present everything as
extraordinarily challenging for intelligence. For example, at one point he writes that
Latin America ‘may currently pose the most complex set of problems for America’s
spies’ (p.210), while elsewhere he comments that cyber war may be the most
significant threat to the United States. And current intelligence insiders would most
likely argue that he is being too hard on the American intelligence community.10 But
overall, despite its flaws, this book provides a useful critique of the state of the
American intelligence community today.
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Quenby Olmsted Hughes, ‘In the Interest of Democracy’: The Rise and Fall of the
Early Cold War Alliance Between the American Federation of Labor and the Central
Intelligence Agency (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2011). Pp. 204. Biblio, index. £32/$55. Pb.
ISBN 978-3-0343-0212-8.
When historians first gained access to the papers of the international labor expert Jay
Lovestone in the mid-1990s, they came across some rather unusual documents. One,
for example, filed among the 895 boxes of Lovestone manuscripts held by the
Hoover Institution at Stanford University (another huge collection resided at the
9Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American
Security State (NY: Little, Brown, 2011).
10For a more positive take, see for example James R. Clapper, ‘How 9/11 Transformed the
Intelligence Community,’ The Wall Street Journal, 7 September 2011.
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